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Abstract 
 
 
The long run financial performances of privatised firms have rarely been investigated. This study 
examines the financial and operational performance within the Pakistani cement industry utilising two 
decades of post-privatisation data. Broadly speaking, regression analyses confirm that long term 
positive impacts of reforms and privatization on profitability, output and investment are uncertain. After 
controlling for firm, industry and economic factors, our estimates show that privatised firms initially 
improved their profitability but recorded a statistically significant decline over a longer period. The sale 
efficiency, capacity utilisation, and leverage indicators however improved over a considerably long post 
ownership change period.  
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1. Introduction 
In contrast to the stated aims of governments in the implementation of broad reforms including the 
privatisation programme across the world, the available empirical evidence on the actual impact of 
privatisation in making the overall industry and privatised firms financially viable in the long run, has 
either been assessed occasionally and/or conclusions are at best mixed. A number of studies from both 
developed and developing countries suggest instantaneous positive impact of change of ownership on 
firms’ financial outcomes. Some of these studies include Bishop and Kay (1989), Adam and Mistry 
(1992), Megginson et al. (1994), Wei et al. (2003), Boubakria  et al. (2004), D’Souzaa et al. (2005), 
Boubakri  et al. (2005), Mathur and Banchuenvijit (2007), Farinós  et al. (2007), Naceur  et al. (2007), 
Ghosh (2008), Huanga  and Yao (2010), Huang  and Wang (2011), and Zhang et al. (2012). There are 
also a number of studies particularly those related to developing and emerging countries since the 
beginning of century concluding that the change of policy or ownership did not produce the desired 
outcome, and thus firms remained miserably less capitalised, with severe issues of liquidity and 
profitability. The studies that concluded either no improvement in operating performance or in fact 
decline of the privatized firms include Harper (2001) for Czech, Boubakri and Cosset (2002) for African 
countries, Chen et al. (2006) and Li  et al. (2007) for Chinese, and Cook and Uchida (2008) for 
developing countries firms.    
 
There could be a number of reasons for these contrasting conclusions. One of the main reasons could 
be that a significant number of studies used only few years of post-privatisation data and concluded an 
improvement in performance of privatised firms, and did not consider the dynamic impact of reforms 
and privatisation which are likely to materialise over a longer time period. Interestingly, a significant 
number of early and mid-1990s studies used a relatively short time span and selected few financial 
ratios to evaluate the financial performance of the industry as well as privatised firms. These studies 
did not explicitly elaborate how newly privatised firms would adjust to changing macroeconomic 
environments, political risks and competition in inputs market in the long run. It takes time to make 
adjustments in inputs mix and to expand production capacity to realise economies of scale. Years of 
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under-investment under public ownership would require a persistently longer time to increase 
investment spending to upgrade technology. In addition, it also takes time to adjust to a changed 
competitive environment for sourcing of inputs and selling of final products, and firms may adopt a 
‘wait and see’ policy, to assess the new environment and make use of newly acquired freedom in 
adjusting input/output levels. Similarly, a changed competitive environment could force firms to think 
beyond the domestic market and start exporting surplus production as a result of significant investment 
in production capacity additions. The new management of privatised firms could wait for a few years 
to learn about the new market and competitor experience in exporting. This ‘wait and see’ policy, could 
also be the result of a labour union signing a contract with the government at the time of management 
transfer, to avoid political unrest due to firing  workers after the transfer of ownership. 
 
Hence, evidence of immediate positive or negative impacts on profitability and efficiency could have 
been due to: reductions in the labour force before privatisation of the firms, substantial increases in 
income from non-production sources such as bank deposits and investment income, some immediate 
temporary market adjustment processes in a competitive environment, pending investment decisions or 
aggressive investment in technology upgrades after transfers of ownership, and more importantly better 
macroeconomic conditions immediately after reforms and mass privatisation policies being announced. 
Thus, the true financial and operational benefits of reforms and privatisation could have been over or 
under stated by a significant number of early and mid-1990s influential empirical studies appearing in 
financial journals in particular.  
 
Considering the above points, a longitudinal study of privatised firms examining a longer post- 
privatisation time period is more appropriate, desirable and is likely to produce robust findings. A 
primary objective of this study is to compare the long run financial and operational performance of 
privatised firms over pre- and post-policy periods. Our study covers privatised firms over a 26 year time 
period encompassing four business cycles, six political governments and one military government, each 
with its own strategy/policy. The profitability, efficiency, liquidity, solvency, output and leverage 
estimates derived from a longer sample period are likely to be robust to short term fluctuations in 
5 
 
economic conditions and distortion created by another government policy in addition to firms’ wait and 
see policy and the dynamic process of inputs/out market adjustments over a longer time period. We use 
the Pakistani cement industry as a case study which has undergone substantial adjustments as a result 
of deregulation and privatisation. Since the implementation of a privatisation policy in 1991-92, all of 
the cement producing firms in public ownership have been transferred to private owners. The producers 
are no longer price takers and the industry has now started exporting a large quantity of cement to 
neighbouring countries and the Middle East.  
 
The contribution of this study towards existing literature is five-fold. First, rather than depending on a 
few selected financial ratios, we use a number of financial ratio indicators to evaluate firms’ financial 
performance in terms of profitability, efficiency, liquidity, solvency, output and investment. This helps 
us in reducing the possibility of distortion created by different recordings of taxes, income and 
expenditures related accounting data. Second, in the context of the financial impacts of privatisation 
and reforms, we have not been able to identify other studies that have utilised such a long time period 
of data. Interestingly, Megginson (2016) summarised seventeen empirical studies produced/published 
since 2004 with similar objectives and indicators of post privatisation performance evaluation. Out of 
these, thirteen of the studies evaluated a single country’s privatisation experience including eight of 
only Chinese, two Indian and the remaining two in the transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe. None of these studies however, covered the long period comparable to our study. Furthermore, 
with the exception of the Indian studies, all other countries especially China has a different economic 
and corporate structure compared to the majority of other developing countries. A recent study by 
Ghulam and Jaffry (2015) evaluated the productivity and efficiency performance of the Pakistani 
cement industry, but comprehensive studies of the long run financial performance of industries from 
non-socialist (current or previous) developing countries in particular have not been undertaken 
frequently. Thus, this study provides useful findings of the short, mid (up to 10 years) and long term 
(more than 10 years) dynamic impact of reforms and privatisation on privatised firms’ operational and 
financial performance.  
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Third, unlike a number of studies that have evaluated post-reform/privatisation financial performance, 
we also account for firms’ heterogeneity in terms of size, location and exporting status, initial 
conditions, economic environment and development of industry competitive conditions in our empirical 
design. The endogeneity issues of a number of explanatory variables to model the determinants of 
financial performances are also addressed by using Hausman and Taylor’s (1981) estimator. Hence, our 
broader conclusions are less affected by industry specific factors, changed competitive environment and 
prevailing economic and political conditions. Fifth, the Pakistani cement industry has been alleged to 
have formed a tacit collusion to earn higher profit. There have been a number of investigations by the 
regulatory authorities since the ‘mass privatisation’ policy in the early 1990s. The industry has been 
charged of setting higher prices by colluding and earning exceptional margins. The findings of this 
study shed some light on the validity of abnormal profit claims by consumer groups. In summary, this 
study provides an interesting setting to investigate how changes of ownership has affected firms’ long 
term strategy in terms of price setting, production and cost dynamics during a period spreading over 
more than a quarter of a century. 
 
The findings of this study could be summarised in five points. (1) Similar to a number of empirical 
studies in this area, broadly speaking, the group of privatised firms improved their profitability margins 
in the short run immediately after the change of ownership, but then became significantly less profitable 
over longer post-privatisation time periods due to less conducive economic conditions, changes in 
competition environment of inputs and output markets, political risks and government taxation policy. 
(2) The longer run impacts of reforms on privatised firms’ financial efficiency, to a large extent, was 
positive. (3) Privatised firms improved their leverage and net-worth in the first ten years and long lasting 
impacts continued for the next decade. (4) The output of privatised firms approximated by inflation 
adjusted sales and capital investment, did not improve immediately as well over the longer run post 
ownership change period. (5) A parametric approach to model the determinants of firms’ performance 
confirmed that the role of industry and firm specific factors, initial conditions before ownership changes 
and economic conditions was very important in determining the financial performance of privatised 
firms. Overall, the findings of this study cast  doubts on earlier influential empirical findings concluding 
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with positive impact of reforms on profitability in particular, based on few years of post-privatisation 
data and without due consideration to initial conditions as well as firm, industry and economy specific 
factors over the longer time period.   
  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a review of existing empirical evidence 
on the impact of privatisation and reforms. The cement industry’s institutional set-up and transformation 
are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 and 5 are dedicated for the explanation of our methodology and 
data sources we have used to assemble a historical financial dataset on the cement industry. We present 
our empirical regression results in Section 6 and provide further explanation of revered or modest longer 
run impact of reforms in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 contains a summary of our main findings, 
limitations and directions for future research.   
 
2. The impact of reforms and privatisation – A review of the literature 
By using comparable firms and industries that included privatised, private and state owned firms, both 
of the above questions have been addressed by a number of studies but are full of contrasting results 
(see Table 1). For simplification, we classify the literature on firms’ performance analysis into two 
categories. The first category analyses the nature of ownership (private, state and hybrid) and the 
performance of the firm, while the second discusses the issue of the performance of privatised firms in 
the pre- and post-privatisation time periods. In the first case, broadly speaking, two sets of conclusions 
have emerged from empirical case studies. The first finds private ownership clearly superior, while the 
second favours state ownership or at least does not consider state ownership as a hurdle to the efficient 
operation of the firm.  
 
In the context of the post-reform/privatisation impact on the firms’ performance, two types of 
conclusions have emerged over the past 25 years. The initial studies by authors such as Bishop and Kay 
(1989), Megginson et al. (1994) and Galal et al. (1994) supported the positive impact of reforms and 
privatisation on operational performance of firms. Since 2000, by using a relatively longer post reforms 
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sample period, more efforts have been made to compare the performance of firms in pre- and post-
privatisation time periods. For a survey of such studies, we suggest readers look at Megginson (2016). 
This includes studies covering samples from developed, developing and emerging economies. 
Interestingly, similar to earlier studies, empirical evidence is inconclusive. A significant number of 
studies such as Villalonga (2000), Loh et al. (2003), Wei et al. (2003), Boubakri et al. (2004), D’Souzaa 
et al. (2005), Boubakri et al. (2005), Mathur and Banchuenvijit (2007), Farinós et al. (2007), Naceur et 
al. (2007), Ghosh (2008), Huang and Yao (2010), Huang and Wang (2011) and Ghulam and Jaffry 
(2015) concluded that firms under private management after privatisation performed better. Studies 
such as Harper (2001), Chen et al. (2006), Li et al. (2007) and Cook and Uchida (2008) concluded the 
opposite, while authors such as Boubakri and Cosset (2002) and Zhang et al. (2012) found post-
privatisation performance was either mixed or showed no improvement.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
It could be argued that although there is a vast body of literature on the public-private firms’ 
performance comparison and the impact of broader reforms and privatisation on firms’ operational and 
financial performance, the evidence is inconclusive. A critical analysis of these studies revealed that 
there could have been a number of reasons for the contrasting conclusions. Firstly, it could be due to 
the research methodology used in each study. A significant number of studies used non-parametric 
method to estimate post-and pre-privatisation efficiency, productivity and financial outcome of the 
privatised and non-privatised firms. This method has been criticised for dealing with outliers in the data, 
convergence issues due to fewer numbers of observations, and being unable to account for initial 
conditions and joint impacts of firm and industry specific factors as well as economic environments. 
Parametric methods, on the other hand, are subject to criticism due to strong assumptions required to 
estimate production/cost/profit function parameters.  
 
Secondly, as discussed in our introduction section, earlier pioneering and well-cited studies on the 
impact of reforms and privatisation on firms’ financial performance in particular, published in finance 
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centric journals have generally used a short time span and the aggregation of different industries. We 
focus on a single industry over a very long time period, with alternative proxies of firms’ financial and 
operational performance. Our effort in compiling a large financial historical dataset from a developing 
country provided us with an opportunity to compute a number of alternative financial ratios for more 
robust and detailed analyses. 
 
3. Pakistani cement industry  
Reforms including privatisation policies: Similar to other countries, the Pakistani government in 1990, 
headed by an industrialist who was committed to a free market economy, came to power. A surging budget 
deficit and pressure from the donor agencies forced the government to enact ‘mass privatisation’ of state 
industrial assets. The government sold 66 manufacturing firms and commercial banks to the private sector 
in 1991-92.Seven cement manufacturing firms were privatised (see Table 2). The privatisation process for 
two more was also completed at the time but the transfer of ownership was delayed due to a payment delay, 
and was finalised later. The privatisation of two more firms was completed in 1996. By the middle of the 
2000’s all the nationalised cement manufacturing firms had been privatised.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Historical development of the industry: At the beginning of 1986-87, the Pakistan cement industry 
consisted of 17 operating plants with a total nominal installed capacity of 7.7 million tonne per year (tpy). 
Thirteen of the plants, comprising about 6.0 million tpy (78% of total capacity) belonged to the state and 
four with installed capacity of 1.63 million tpy were in the private sector. By the end of 1996, the total 
number of cement manufacturing firms had increased to 23, with six new firms entering the market during 
1988-96 (all in the private sector). Since that time, a number of new firms have entered the market and 
some older established firms were acquired by the competitor firms. The government implemented a 
privatisation programme within the industry, resulting in all public sector firms being privatised. A majority 
of existing firms expanded their production capacity subsequent to reforms and privatisation. After the 
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mergers and acquisition, the number of cement manufacturing plants in the country was 21 in 2011, and 
the productive capacity had increased to 45 million tpy.  
 
3.2 Industry pricing policy: In June 1985, the government of Pakistan abandoned its long-standing cement 
price controls and freight equalisation. Following price liberalisation, the government introduced a number 
of changes in its pricing procedures. The freight equalisation formula was abolished and dealers became 
responsible for making their own transport arrangements. The government plant managers were allowed to 
modify the ex-plant price. Only two plants took advantage of the more flexible pricing policy, one southern 
market plant selling below the government's standard ex-factory price and a northern market plant selling 
above it. Plant managers however, were expected to become increasingly responsive as competitive 
pressure from the private sector firms started to intensify. After privatisation of state-owned firms, the 
government lost its power over the cement sector and the ‘All Pakistan Cement Manufacturer Association’ 
(APCMA), representing more than 80% of private and privatised firms cement manufacturers in the 
country, set a price upon which all its members agreed.  
 
Market structure: The market underwent both quantitative and qualitative change after liberalisation 
and the privatisation process of 1991-92. The market was no longer a ‘seller’s market’, and prices 
responded to market forces following events such as the commissioning of new private sector cement 
plants, the abandonment of cost-plus pricing, elimination of the freight subsidy and the overall 
competitive market environment in the aftermath of broader economic reforms, deregulation and 
privatisation. The home market was now divided into two main geographical zones, i.e. north and south. 
The former covers Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Azad Jammu Kashmir and part of Punjab, whereas the south 
covers Sindh, Balochistan and the rest of the Punjab. At present, out of the total production capacity of 
clinker (intermediate output), about 83% are in the north and the remaining 17% in the south. The higher 
ratio of capacity located in the north is mainly due to the availability of raw material and proximity to 
two big export markets (India and Afghanistan). 
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4. Firms’ financial performance analysis methodology – use of alternative 
financial ratios 
Many financial ratios have been used in empirical studies as proxies of profitability, efficiency, output, 
investment and leverage. It has been common to use one or two financial ratios to analyse each of the 
elements of the firms’ financial performance. However, using a limited number of financial ratios could 
lead to misleading conclusions due to the different ways of reporting profit, sales, depreciation, and the 
cost of goods sold in addition to differences in tax treatment of income and expenditure items in 
different countries. Hence, rather than depending on one particular ratio we used a number of ratios for 
each element of the financial performance measure. 
 
Starting with profitability, we used six alternative financial ratios. The first in this case is the widely 
used ratio in the earlier financial impact studies: return on sale (ROS). ROS is calculated as net after 
tax income/gross sale. Some other alternative financial ratios include: first return on assets (ROA1) = 
net profit before tax/total assets, second return on assets (ROA2) = gross profit (loss)/total assets, first 
operating profit margin (OPM1) = (gross profit (loss)-admin & selling expenses)/net sale (after 
deducting of sales tax and excise duty), second operating profit margin (OPM2) = (gross profit (loss)-
admin & selling expenses)/total assets, and gross profit margin (GPM) = (gross profit (loss) + 
depreciation cost)/net sale. These alternative financial ratios are used to accommodate differences in 
accounting treatments of taxes, income, expenses, assets and liabilities items.  
      
We used five ratios to evaluate firms’ operating and financial efficiency. These included three 
commonly used workforce utilisation based ratios and two rarely used ratios such as IM and ACP: 
labour use efficiencies measured by net income per employee (NIE), sale per employee (SE), asset per 
employee (ASPE), capacity utilisation (CAPUT), interval measure (IM), and average collection period 
(ACP). IM is defined by adding most liquid assets including cash and short term investment and then 
dividing by total financial expenditures (interest and principal payments on bank loans etc.). This ratio 
measures the firm’s strength to meet financial obligations. A higher ratio indicates that the firm’s 
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management is keeping a reasonable hedge against its liabilities. The ACP is defined as average 
receivables divided by average daily sales and is an activity or asset utilisation ratio. The ratio 
determines the number of days that the average receivable is pending during the year, and is closely 
associated with the efficiency with which assets are managed. The lower the ratio, the lower the time 
of collection of outstanding assets (receivables). 
 
Similarly, two proxy ratios were computed to determine the capital investment performance: capital 
investment to sales (CAPSAL) and capital investment to total assets (CAPAS). We examined output 
by using inflation-adjusted real sales (RSALE). To measure the insurance against financial insolvency 
of the firms, balance sheets as well as income statement accounts were used to determine the leverage 
position of the firms. For liquidity, solvency and leverage, we used financial ratios such as cash ratio 
(CR) that utilises the most liquid current assets such as cash in hand and short-term investment in stocks 
divided by current liabilities, working capital ratio (WCR), net worth relative to total liabilities 
(NWTL), leverage ratio (LEVER), and time interest earned (TIE) ratio. Not a commonly used ratio, 
TIE in particularly is defined as gross profit plus depreciation minus operating expenses and then 
divided by financial expenses. This ratio measures the number of times resources are available to pay 
off financial expenses. 
 
A number of factors could potentially affect firms’ financial performance, independent of ownership 
change. Some authors such as Villalonga (2000), and Garia and Anson (2012) have addressed this issue 
by modelling profitability and other performance measures on political, economic, organisational, and 
firm/industry specific factors. By starting with the following general model, we followed the above 
mentioned studies and modelled performance (𝒀𝒀) such as profitability, efficiency, leverage and capital 
expenditure represented by different financial ratios mentioned above of firm i in year t on firm and 
industry specific and macroeconomic variables as follows:  
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝐴𝐴1𝛽𝛽1 + 𝐴𝐴2𝛽𝛽2 + Χ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽3 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(1) 
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Where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the performance outcome variable of firm i in period t, 𝛼𝛼 is an intercept term, and 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 are 
parameters to be estimated for the firm/industry and economy related factors. 𝐴𝐴1 represents a vector of 
two dummy variables that takes the value ‘1’ for the immediate and medium or relatively long term 
impact of change of ownership (1-5 and 6-10 years post-change of ownership) and ‘0’ otherwise. 𝐴𝐴2 is 
a vector of two dummy variables equal to ‘1’ for the longer time periods (11-15 and 16-20 years post- 
change of ownership) and ‘0’ otherwise. In addition to these dummy variables, a series of 
macroeconomic and firm specific control variables are represented by the vector of variables Χ. 
 
Our sample period could potentially suffer from cross-sectional dependence given the fact that the 
demand for cement and firms’ subsequent decisions regarding marketing, technology upgrade as well 
as capacity additions etc. could exhibit a cyclical nature. Petersen (2009) observed that ignoring cross-
sectional dependence could lead to biased standards, errors and small confidence intervals. The 
inclusion of time period dummies could solve this issue, but this would not solve some other serious 
statistical issues. For example in the above model, we have not considered the role of unobserved 
individual firms’ heterogeneity. The unobservable attributes such as the management’s cumulative 
experience, skill set and motivations etc. could have a significant impact on firms’ performance. 
Ignoring these in our regression model could lead the OLS estimates to suffer from an omitted variable 
bias.  
 
One solution to these issues has been to use fixed or random effect panel regression models to account 
for unobserved individual firms’ specific heterogeneity. The random effect model assumes that all 
unobserved variables that could have any bearing on firms’ performance measures are randomly 
distributed across firms. Furthermore, these unobserved time invariant individual firm specific effects 
are uncorrelated with control variables as well as post-reform and privatisation dummy variables. The 
fixed effect model allows for the possibility of correlation between unobserved individual firm effects 
and regressors, but cannot identify time invariant variables such as geographical location of the 
production facility etc. The Hausman Taylor approach (Hausman and Taylor (1981)) has some clear 
improvements to fixed and random effect regressions as well as preserving the advantages of both fixed 
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and random effect techniques. It does not require external instruments to accommodate endogeneity 
issues of the independent variables and hence, avoids the search for appropriate instruments and could 
be used to assess the impact of policy interventions on firms’ financial performance measures.  
 
The Hausman and Taylor model can be specified as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + Χ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽1 + Χ2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽2 + Μ1𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾1 + Μ2𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾2 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(2) 
Where 𝒀𝒀𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 represents the performance indicator as discussed above for firm i in t time period; 𝜶𝜶 is the 
intercept term; the two vectors 𝚾𝚾 and 𝚳𝚳 represent sets of observed time varying and time-invariant 
control variables respectively that affect the firms’ financial performance indicator variables. The two 
variables 𝝁𝝁𝒊𝒊 and 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 represent the individual firm fixed effects and the time varying error terms. In the 
above specification, the subscript ‘1’ represents variables that are assumed to be uncorrelated with 𝝁𝝁𝒊𝒊 
(and 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊), whereas the subscript ‘2’ refers to those that are assumed to be correlated with 𝝁𝝁𝒊𝒊 (but still 
uncorrelated with 𝜺𝜺𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊).  
 
As discussed above, we categorised the post- privatisation years into four sub-sets, 1-5 years, 6-10 
years, 11-15 years, and 16-20 years since being privatised of a state-owned firm. By following the 
empirical literature, we used a number of variables to control for firm and industry specific variables as 
well as prevailing market conditions. Industry competition conditions were approximated by the 
Herfindahl index (based on gross sales) and average industrial profitability. The government long run 
taxation policy impacts were captured by the ratios of sales tax payments to total sales and excise duty 
payments to total sales. The role of ‘learning by exporting’ was approximated by the ratio of export sale 
to total sale. The size of the firm was measured by the firm’s total production capacity. Regional 
differences in sourcing inputs and selling output were captured by a dummy variable equal to ‘1’ if 
firms operated in the north (time-invariant control variable). Technology differences were captured by 
the dummy variable equal to ‘1’ for the firms using advanced dry process technology. The accumulation 
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of market knowledge was approximated by the firm’s age. The product market demand conditions were 
approximated by the firms’ capacity utilisation rate and GDP growth rates. The efficiency of a firm in 
using its assets to generate sale was captured by the asset turnover ratio and finally, firms’ day to day 
cash constraints were approximated by the WCR. CAPUT and export revenues/total sale were treated 
as endogenous variables in our regression framework using equation (2) above. 
 
5. Data sources 
For the estimation of financial ratios and subsequent regression, we collected data from various sources, 
such as annual reports of the former Expert Advisory Cell, Government of Pakistan, annual audited 
accounts of the sample firms (various issues), annual un-audited accounts of the state-owned firms 
(various issues), annual report of the State Bank of Pakistan (various issues), Economic Survey, 
Ministry of Finance, Census of Manufacturing Industries (CMI), Government of Pakistan (various 
issues), Cement Directory (1991), National Development Finance Corporation, Government of Pakistan 
and Fifty Years of Pakistan Statistics. 
 
6. Empirical results  
In the following discussion, we present and discuss our findings from the Hausman Taylor estimator 
regression results of the determinants of firms’ financial and operational performance measured by 
firms’ profitability, efficiency, output, investment and liquidity and solvency indicators. As discussed 
in the methodology section, we treat some of the explanatory variables as endogenously determined 
and our empirical design and regression methodology accommodated this statistical issue. To observe 
the impact of reforms and privatisation over different time periods, we compare financial performance 
over immediate (1-5 years), mid-term (6-10 years) and longer (11-15 and 16-20 years) post- 
privatisation periods. In our effort to observe the combined effect of post privatisation years, we 
summed individual coefficients attached to each dummy variable (1-5, 6-10, 11-15 and 16-20 years 
after privatised). The delta method was used to calculate standard errors of summed up coefficients 
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which are then subsequently used to determine significance of combined coefficients. The last four lines 
of tables 3-6 contains these estimates. 
  
Profitability 
In our effort to observe the net effect of change of ownership and other broader reforms after introducing 
controls and initial conditions such as firm and industry specific variables, and macroeconomic 
environment, we ran a multivariate regression on the sample of our subject group (privatised firms). 
Table 3 reports the regression coefficients of dummy variables for post-privatisation years among other 
determinants. By considering the statistically significant coefficients only, our regression results 
showed that three profitability ratios in particular ROA2, OPM2 and GPM indicated that performance 
improved in the first five years of the post-privatisation period. In the longer time period (16-20 years 
after a firm was privatised), the impact was however negative and statistically significant for three ratios 
including the broadly used profitability ratio ROS. The sum of coefficients also generally supported 
this finding and negative influence of ownership change over a longer time period (1-20 years after 
privatised) was also confirmed by the statistically significant coefficient for ROS in particular.  
 
The impact of tax burdens measured by excise duty and sales tax on individual firms’ profitability was 
negative and statistically significant for all profitability ratios. The increase in the capacity utilisation 
and export sale revenues was profitability enhancing and statistically significant for a significant 
number of profitability ratios including/excluding other income and interest expenses. As for other 
variables in the regression analysis, some interesting observations can be made; for instance, individual 
firms’ performance was in line with industry trends as the coefficient for industry profitability was 
positive and statistically significant. The central bank interest rate had a negative and significant impact 
on profitability. This result is not surprising, as most of the privatised firms borrowed a significant 
amount of funds in the post-privatisation period to reinforce capacities, improve infrastructure and 
invest in marketing and distributions channels. 
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The regression coefficients for other variables showed that privatised firms using the most advanced 
and cost efficient technology (dry) were more profitable when compared to firms using relatively less 
efficient methods such as the semi dry and wet, which consume more fuel and are less labour efficient. 
The age of the firm was also positively related with profitability indicating accumulation of knowledge 
and networking and distribution capacity. This further indicates that well established firms, with 
updated technology, were likely to be more experienced in dealing with peaks and troughs in the 
macroeconomic environment, demand uncertainty, and cost inflations in the longer time period. As for 
the privatised firms initial condition before change of ownership variables, larger sized firms at the time 
of privatisation maintained their superior performance in the post-privatisation period too.  
 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
Efficiency  
Overall, regression results after controlling for initial conditions and factors relevant for firm/economic 
effects, showed that a positive impact during immediate, medium and longer term periods was 
statistically significant for only sale per employee (individual dummy variables coefficients showing 
that impact lasted over 11-15 years but sum of coefficient indicating that positive impact continued up 
to 20 years after change of ownership). The sum of individual coefficients related to net income per 
employee (NIE) also showed that the impact was positive but statistically insignificant over longer post-
privatisation periods. The same could be said of assets per employee (ASPE). After privatisation, these 
firms used technological and production resources more efficiently, and as a result, capacity utilisation 
(CAPUT) improved significantly. Interestingly, individual regression coefficients for 5, 15 and 20 years 
post-privatisation were all positive and statistically significant.  
 
Asset utilisation ratio in terms of average receivables and represented by an average collection period 
(ACP) increased over time which perhaps suggests a more lenient policy in terms of credit sales by the 
new management of privatised companies over a  longer time period. The sum of individual coefficients 
did not show any statistically significant marked improvement/decline in interval measure (IM). Similar 
to profitability, the government’s indirect taxation policy had a significant negative effect on the assets, 
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sales and income per employee as well as capacity utilisation. Increasing CAPUT levels and exports 
also had a significantly positive impact on SE. Export sales ratios had no significant bearing on CAPUT 
levels nor did the central bank interest rate have any significant role in any of the efficiency indicators 
except IM. For IM, export sales ratios had a positive effect while interest rates had a negative effect.  
Hence broadly speaking, contrary to profitability ratios, the long term impact of reforms on privatised 
firms efficiency indicators appear to be a generally not  negative. This finding of long term improvement 
in efficiency is in fact similar to Ghulam and Jaffry (2015) of the Pakistani cement industry productivity.  
 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
 
Financial leverage, liquidity and solvency 
A major criticism of the firms operating under state ownership was that most of them were not only less 
profitable and inefficient but in fact they were technically insolvent with severe liquidity constraints. 
Hence, one of the major objectives of transferring to private ownership was to make them survive and 
keep them liquid and solvent in a longer time period without any recourse to public funds. For privatised 
firms, starting with debt or financial leverage (LEVER) which comprises long and short term 
borrowing, this decreased immediately after privatisation and this trend continued over medium and 
longer time periods (see Table 5). The sum of individual coefficients show that decrease was statistically 
significant over a longer time period (up to 15 years after transfer of ownership). Furthermore, 
regression results also confirmed that rising export revenues would help reduce leverage for the group 
of privatised firms.  
 
Interestingly, regression results after controlling for other factors did not support a significant effect of 
change of ownership on CR in any of the post-privatisation sub-periods. The impact is positive but 
statistically insignificant. The estimates also confirmed the point that increase in sales tax negatively 
impacted CR. Surprisingly, an increase in CAPUT would also have a similar impact on firms’ liquidity. 
One reason could be the fact that increases in CAPUT could increase wear and tear of the machinery 
which would require higher maintenance cost.  
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[Insert table 5 about here] 
The second measure of liquidity employed is the WCR. The regression results showed WCR, in fact 
declined significantly over the 6-10 years post-privatisation after controlling industrial and economic 
conditions. The sum of individual coefficients estimates also show that the long term impact is also 
negative and statistically significant. An increase in CAPUT would help increase WCR. Surprisingly, 
an increase in sales tax payment also increased WCR. By using an alternative measure such as NWTL, 
the improvement was also statistically significant for the privatised group of firms over shorter and 
medium post-privatisation time periods. Aggregation of individual coefficients confirmed that net worth 
of the privatised firms relative to their liabilities in fact improved over a longer time period after the 
transfer of ownership. Similarly to leverage, export revenues increased the net worth of firms.  
 
A second approach to assess solvency is the use of the income statement ratios. We employed time 
interest earned (TIE) defined as gross profit plus depreciation minus operating expenses and then 
divided by financial expenses. This ratio measures the number of times resources are available to pay 
off financial expenses. Interestingly, regression results did not even support improvement over a shorter 
post-privatisation time period. Furthermore, regression results also confirmed the fact that for privatised 
firms, an increase in sales tax would reduce the cash cushion for interest expenses. 
 
Output and investment 
The regression estimates relating to individual time specific dummy variables contained in Table 6 
reveals that the increase in real sales during the longer time periods was statistically significant for the 
16-20 years post privatisation period. The combined impact measured by adding four regression 
coefficients was not statistically significant. Similarly, the regression results in Table 6 did not show 
any significant improvement in the capital spending after controlling for firm and industry specific 
factors and economic environment. This was true of individual post privatised dummy variables as well 
as combined effect. One of the interesting messages from the regression result was the negative impact 
of government taxes (excise duty and sales tax) on real sales of the privatised firms. Both taxes we 
considered in this case were indirect taxes which could have been shifted to consumers. This might 
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have resulted in a decrease in demand due to increasing levels of output prices. As anticipated, higher 
capacity utilisations and firm size increased output measured by real sales. However, an unexpected 
result in this case was the negative impact of GDP growth on real sales. In the case of investment, with 
the exception of two variables (one for each investment indicator dependent variable), all other firms-
specific, industry and economic conditions had no statistically significant impact.  
  
[Insert table 6 about here] 
 
Were the privatised firm’s findings different from other comparable firms in the industry? 
 Despite our efforts in controlling a number of factors in multivariate regression, attributing bad or good 
performances purely on a change of ownership could be subject to debate for a variety of reasons. We 
carried out a sensitivity analysis exercise and compared the privatised firm’s performance against those 
ten firms that were set up under private ownerships and remained so subsequently throughout our 
sample period.  We slightly modified our regression model where four dummy variables representing 
post ownership change were replaced with post reforms time period. The new dummy variables in fact 
represent post reforms period (1991/92 onward when first firms were privatised). We also dropped 
initial condition variables because they are not relevant in this case of private firms. Table 7 contains 
regression estimates of those dependent variables which were either used extensively in the literature 
on this issue or produced statistically significant coefficients (Tables 3-6) after aggregation of individual 
post ownership change time specific variables and their coefficients. 
 
We focus on the estimates contained in the last four lines of Table 7. Broadly speaking, the performance 
of privatised firms appeared to be relatively better based on the financial performance indicators 
represented by eight dependent variables except profitability (ROS). The estimates related to ROS did 
confirm that profitability declined for the private firms, but the decline was not statistically significant. 
Sale efficiency and capacity utilisation improved but the improvement was not statistically significant. 
The outcome of dependent variables representing financial strengths and health (LEVER, WCR and 
NWTL) also did not show any better than privatised firms except NWTL which showed a  better 
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situation for the longer time period (1-15 years after reforms). Real sales and investment declined and 
the decline is statistically significant too.        
 
7. Further understanding of long run reversed profitability effect  
The contribution of this study as discussed before is not only limited to long run performance evaluation 
of an industry in a developing country setting, but to also understand how short run performance 
evaluation, which has been the main feature of the most of the early studies on the issue, may have 
overestimated the impact on profitability performance in particular. The generalisation of  developed 
countries findings in terms of positive profitability impacts of reforms and privatization to  all the 
developing countries and industries could also be subject to debate unless, a number of case studies in 
this context for different economic and political and corporate settings are available. We highlighted 
the fact in the introduction section of the paper that most post 2004 published/completed studies, in 
particular covering a longer post reforms period, are related to planned economies such as China and 
Vietnam, and this could suffer generalisation issues. Our empirical results for the Pakistani cement 
industry clearly show that contrary to short term positive effects, long term financial implications in 
terms of profitability of the reforms including privatization could be less assured. This finding is 
confirmed by our case study using parametric tests. In the following, we discuss factors which could 
have contributed to at best modest results, and at worst, a decrease in profitability, in particular over a 
longer run of the Pakistani cement industry. 
 
 
We first start with the role of macroeconomic conditions that could have serious effects on the long run 
profitability of an industry after reforms and privatisation. In an effort to further understand the 
contribution of macroeconomic environments in improving or negatively affecting privatised firms 
profitability performance, Table 8 shows statistics for two sub-periods: 1986-92 for pre privatisation 
periods and 1993-2011 for post. The statistics contained in Table 8 clearly show that macroeconomic 
conditions were less favourable subsequent to the launch of the privatisation policy. A significant and 
gradual increase in sales tax (indirect tax which is generally passed on to consumers) had pushed retail 
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output prices up after reforms and privatisation, and thus negatively affected demand for cement and 
subsequently eroded margins. Unemployment and interest rates were higher, earning yields were 
marginally less, growth in public sector investment, government development expenditures, foreign 
investment, construction sector activity and GDP growth rate, all of these factors that boost demand for 
cement performed less favourably and perhaps contributed to stagnant or a reduced level of industry 
earning over the longer time period. The negative impact of these variables had offset any positive effect 
of reforms and change of ownership over a longer time period. This indeed proves the point that a longer 
run positive impact of reforms on firms’ profitability in particular depends on favourable 
macroeconomic conditions and government fiscal policy in general and taxation in particular, which 
were not commonly discussed in the earlier studies using the shorter post reforms period.  
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Broadly speaking and as discussed before, a significant number of earlier studies conducted in the 1990s 
on the impact of privatisation on firms’ performance either did not consider the dynamic impact, or 
under estimated the influence of broader deregulation regimes on input prices in particular over the 
longer time period. The modest improvement or a decline in profitability could be partially explained 
by a significant upward adjustment in input prices over the longer time period, due to freedom of setting 
input prices. The following Table 9 clearly shows that any increase in output prices for the cement 
industry, was in fact eaten up by a significant increase in fuel and raw material prices during the longer 
run post reforms and privatisation time period. The fuel prices and related cost constitute a significant 
portion of the overall cost of cement production and a more than 13% annual growth in this cost element 
surely reduced the profit margins. Industry in general was unable to pass on the increase in input prices 
to customers over the longer time period due to less than anticipated demand, considering the 
macroeconomic environment discussed above. Some firms moved from furnace oil to coal as an energy 
source but as shown in the Table 9, the increase in coal price was also higher than output price increase 
over the longer time period. 
 
[Insert table 9 here] 
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Alongside the economic environment and the dynamic effect of a deregulated inputs market, the 
majority of studies evaluating immediate short run effects do not discuss the implications of long run 
increase in political risk in a developing country context. The frequent change of governments, 
deterioration in law & order due to terrorism in an increasing number of countries, could affect both 
publically and privately owned firms but the long run impacts on private sector firms could be more 
severe due to a lack of cushion provided by state ownership. With the exception of the period between 
2000 -2006, Pakistan faced turmoil in the governance of the country. The political governments were 
toppled four times by the presidential orders during the first ten years of post-privatisations and 
privatisation period. This led to uncertainty in the business sector in particular. This resulted in a 
decrease in demand for a significant post reforms time period. The majority of privatised firms made a 
significant investment in capacity additions and technology upgrades immediately after the change of 
ownership by using borrowed money from the financial markets. The depressed demand due to political 
environment alongside an increase in central bank discount rates resulted in higher financial expenses 
per unit produced, which contributed to a decrease in profit margins over the longer time period.  
 
Similarly, one of the other often ignored facts in a developing country context is the intentional under 
declaration of profitability in some cases to avoid paying corporate taxes or to escape being under the 
radar by the competition authorities. The discussion on this issue is beyond the scope of this study but 
news items in the local press on the understatement of income by corporate and personnel sectors are a 
rather regular appearance. Nonetheless, considering these issues, it is not surprising to see that the 
positive impact of reforms on profitability in particular has been limited to immediate post reforms 
period. 
 
Another element often ignored in the short sample studies is the changes in the dynamics of competition 
over the longer time period. In the context of the Pakistani cement industry, there have been allegations 
of collusion among cement producers since the reforms were introduced and ownership was transferred 
to the private sector. Producers associations’ office had been raided by the investigation agencies and 
competition authorities. A study yet to be published by the authors of this study confirmed a decrease 
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in competition levels over the longer post reforms period. To maintain the stability in collusion prices, 
producers had increased the production capacity to maintain market share. The depress demand and 
uneconomical increase in capacity resulted in a decrease in capacity utilisations as discussed above. 
The increase in competition levels abroad has also not helped in absorbing the excess capacity in an 
export market. All this resulted in a pressure on profitability margins over a longer time period. 
Interestingly, and as discussed above, these potential long run dynamics after transfers of ownership 
had not been discussed in earlier studies which have become relevant in our case and could be true for 
a number of other developing countries.             
 
8. Conclusion 
Our review of the literature on the impact of reforms and privatisation on financial and operational 
performance of firms and industry revealed inconsistent conclusions. Some studies clearly showed a 
positive impact while others showed either negative or at best no impact at all. We argue that these 
contrasting conclusions could have been due to a short sample time period of the studies, 
methodological issues or geographic location of the sample firms (probably too much focus on firms in 
developed countries and recently China). By using the Pakistani cement industry as a case study, we 
evaluated financial performance of firms during pre- and post-privatisation time periods. Compared to 
a significant number of earlier studies in this area, we assembled and utilised accounting and operational 
data over a quarter of a century. Our regression based parametric tests accommodated initial conditions 
as well as firm and industry specific factors.  
 
Based on a number of profitability ratios, multivariate regression results confirmed the findings for 
privatised firms after controlling  factors beyond the management’s control and initial conditions that 
privatised firms became more profitable in the first 5 years, but since then became significantly less 
profitable over longer post-ownership change periods compared to public ownership levels. Broadly 
speaking, efficiency results were contrary to profitability. More specifically, regression results 
confirmed significant sale efficiency and capacity utilisation improvement over a longer time period 
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after the transfer of ownership. The net income and assets per employee also improved but the 
improvement was not statistically significant. Furthermore, the privatised firms adjusted well and 
adopted a lenient credit sales policy to keep intact their customer base in the face of new competition 
environment after broader reforms.  
 
Continuing with relatively better efficiency indicators after a change of ownership, regression estimates 
validated the medium and longer term increase in net-worth of the group of privatised firms over 
medium and longer term periods. Similarly, as expected, privatised firms also reduced their debt and 
became less leveraged over the shorter, medium and longer time periods. The cash ratio also improved 
over a longer time period but regression results did not support a statistically significant improvement 
for these group of privatised firms. The working capital ratio did improve initially but the regressions 
results however, supported the fact that working capital ratio declined over the medium and longer post 
privatisation years. The solvency indicator represented by interest cover showed that, time interest 
earned of privatised firms reduced over longer run post- privatisation time periods but regression results 
did not confirm that this decline in interest cover for the group of privatised firms was statistically 
significant.  
 
Finally, the output approximated by real sales value did not increase significantly for privatised firms 
over a broader longer run period despite a significant increase after 15 years of change of ownership. 
Similarly, regression results after controlling for other factors did not show any statistically significant 
improvement. Regression results in fact confirmed a statistically significant decline over 16-20 years 
post-privatisation time period. Lastly, we tried to trace the decline in profitability by considering a 
number of factors that included macroeconomic environment, industry conditions, political risk, 
competitive conditions and dynamic effects of deregulated inputs market. We argue that despite a 
significant role of these factors in explaining the long run disappointing profitability outcome in our 
case study, a number of early influential empirical studies did not focus on these factors adequately and 
could have overestimated the impact of broader economy wide reforms and privatisation on privatised 
firm’s profitability over the longer post ownership time period in particular.  
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Despite making an effort to perform a comprehensive analysis of the impact of reforms and privatisation 
on firms’ financial and operational performance, our study still has some limitations. It would have 
been more appropriate if a social cost-benefit analysis of the policy change was also performed. We 
carried out such an analysis but due to the nature and aims of this study and length of the paper, we do 
not report and discuss these estimates. We hope to publish these findings in a future study. Another 
limitation of our study is that this is related to a country which has witnessed significant troubles since 
2000 due to political turmoil and terrorism related activities. Hence, long term conclusions could have 
been influenced by these issues. It would have been more appropriate to compare our case study results 
to a similar country which had introduced reforms at about the same time such as India to compare and 
contrast our broader conclusions during this time period. We leave this for future research. It would be 
desirable with more financial resources to try and collect data on other comparable manufacturing 
industries and perform similar analyses over a longer time period. Nonetheless, our study despite these 
limitations will hopefully provide a useful reference for future studies on the long term impact of 
reforms on an industry’s and individual firms’ financial and operational performance. 
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Table 1: Twenty influential studies on the impact of broader reforms and privatization since 1989 (in chronological order of publication year) 
Authors Year Sample / type of firms Results 
Bishop and Kay 1989 Shipping, airlines, gas, telecommunication, oil and 
automobile industries 
Most of the privatized industries have grown since privatization and grown more than those industries that have remained in the 
public sector. While output and profit have grown, margins have increased, employment has declined. 
     Adam and Mistry  1992 Industrial enterprises of 8 DCs  Privatization improved profitability and efficiency. 
 Megginson et al.  1994 Panel of forty-one enterprises from fifteen 
countries   
Strong performance improvements without lowering employment. Firms increased real sales, become more profitable, increased 
capital investment spending and improved their operating efficiency. 
Villalonga  2000 Longitudinal study of 24 Spanish firms Negative effect of reforms is eventually offset by the positive effects of the change of ownership.  
Harper  2001 178 privatized Czech  firms  Profitability and efficiency decreased immediately after privatization. Decrease in employment also noted.  
Boubakri and Cosset   2002 16 African privatized companies Profitability improved but not significantly. Efficiency and output decreased slightly but not significantly. Capital expenditures 
rose significantly in the post-privatization period.  
Loh  et al.  2003 Sri Lankan plantation industry Improvement in performance after privatization 
Wei  et al.  2003 208 Chinese privatized firms Significant improvement in real output, real assets, and sales efficiency. No significant change in profitability. However, privatized 
firms improved profitability compared to state owned firms during this period.  
Boubakria  et al.  2004 50 firms from 10 Asian countries  
 
Privatization leads to an increase in profitability, efficiency, and output. However, changes less significant than those reported in 
other developing countries (DCs). 
D’Souzaa et al.   2005 23 developed countries 
129 share-issue   
Profitability, efficiency, output, and capital expenditure significantly increased. Ownership, degree of economic freedom, and 
level of capital market development significantly affect post privatization performance. 
Boubakri  et al. 2005 230 companies from DCs’ Significant increase in profitability, efficiency, investment and output. Changes in performance dependent on macro-economic 
reforms and environment, and the effectiveness of corporate governance. Economic growth is associated with higher profitability 
and efficiency gains; trade liberalization is associated with higher levels of investment and output, while financial liberalization is 
associated with higher output changes. Higher improvements in efficiency for firms in countries in which stock markets are more 
developed. 
Chen et al. 2006 1078 Chinese companies of IPO privatization  Decline in profitability and asset utilization.  
Mathur and Banchuenvijit  2007 103 firms privatized by public share offerings during 
1993–2003  
 
Increases in profitability, operating efficiency, capital spending, output, and dividend payments as well as decreases in leverage 
and total employment. This is true for a wide variety of countries, industries, and competitive environments 
Farinós  et al.  2007 Spanish SOEs privatized by public share issue 
offerings 1990 2001 
Significant operating improvements in Spanish state owned firms after the privatization. Specifically, they show significant 
increases in income efficiency, real sales and employment. 
Naceur  et al.  2007 95 privatized firms (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Turkey) 
Significant increases in profitability and operating efficiency, and significant declines in employment and leverage. Strong 
performance improvements for firms that did remain state-owned, were not sold to foreigners, and that came from Egypt. Job 
losses are higher in Egypt and in firms where the state is no longer in control.  
Li  et al.  2007 155 Chinese firms Profitability declined.   
Cook and Uchida 2008 166 companies from developing countries Deterioration in performance among privatized utilities.  
Ghosh  2008 99 Indian firms Fully government-owned firms significantly less profitable than partially privatized ones. Improvements in profitability largely 
occur during the one to three years just before privatization. Leverage and employment effects are spread out over a much 
longer period.  
Huanga  and Yao  2010 386 Chinese firms privatized in  
1995–2001 
Employment drops more slowly in privatized firms than in pure state-owned firms by a margin of 17.7%. Employment growth 
performance of privatized firms improves over time. 
Huang  and Wang  2011 124 Chinese firms Performance improved. More gains in profitability/efficiency  when dominant shareholder is an “outsider” 
Zhang et al.  2012 364 Chinese firms Profitability decreased. Output and operating efficiency increased. Economic growth, capital market development, institutional 
investors, centralized management, equity refinancing, and external audits are positively associated with post privatization 
performance. Market competition, control of large shareholders, central government control, ownership structure balance, and 
related-party transact firms’ have an impact on performance.  
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Table 2: Privatization of publically owned cement manufacturing firms  
Firm name Sale price 
(Rs. Mil) 
Date of 
transfer 
Buyer name 
    
Maple Leaf Cement 486 1/1/92 Nishat Mills Ltd. 
Pak Cement 189 1/1/92 Mian Jehingir Ellahi & Ass 
White Cement 138 1/1/92 Mian Jehingir Ellahi & Associates 
D.G Khan Cement 1961 1/5/92 Tariq Sehgal & Associates 
Dandot Cement 645 1/5/92 EMG 
Garibwal Cement 836 1/9/92 Haji Saifullah & Group 
Zeal Pak Cement 240 1/10/92 Sardar M. Ashraf D. Baluch 
Kohat Cement 569 1/10/92 Palace Enterprises 
Dandot Works – National Cement 110 1/1/95 EMG 
General Refractories 19 1/2/96 Shah Rukh Engineering 
Associated Cement Wah  2416 1/2/96 EMG 
Associated Cement Rohri 255 1/11/03 National Transport Khi 
Thatta Cement 794 1/1/04 Al Abbass Group 
Mustehkam Cement 3205 1/11/05 Bestway Cement Limited 
Javedan Cement Company 4316 1/8/06 Haji Ghani Usman & Group 
    
Source:  Privatization Commission (PC), Government of Pakistan. 
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Table 3: Long term determinants of privatized firms’ profitability (panel data Hausman Taylor estimator estimates)  ROS ROA1 ROA2 OPM1 OPM2 GPM        1-5 years after privatised (a) -2.5545 2.8973 5.5921*** 3.4656 4.4154** 5.6994* 6-10 years after  privatised (b) -1.4800 -0.6287 1.2606 1.3128 1.6288 7.1002 11-15 years after privatised (c) -9.0825 -1.1483 0.9828 -1.8873 1.9995 1.2548 16-20 years after privatised (d) -33.5212*** -7.3556 -5.1584 -34.1883*** -3.5176 -25.6333*** Firm sales tax paid/total revenues -60.2775** -49.3448*** -58.7282*** -97.3078*** -55.9486*** -80.3601*** Firm excise duty paid/total revenues -60.6195*** -33.2174*** -41.3856*** -84.4995*** -37.2883*** -63.4279*** Firm capacity utilisation   16.7162*** 3.2592** 1.7723 14.8675*** 1.7960 10.9174*** Firm export revenues/sales   0.5564 0.7832*** 0.8088*** 0.6796 0.6484** 0.8042 Firm size measured by production capacity 11.1375*** -2.9167** -1.0565 18.1803*** -1.3028 17.5251*** Firm assets turn over 5.6057** 11.1795*** 12.7397*** 7.4965*** 11.0345*** 2.5120 Firm working capital ratio 0.0507*** 0.0253*** 0.0160** 0.0642*** 0.0192** 0.0361** Firm age (years) -2.1242 -1.7161 -3.7333 -14.7818** -4.8639* -24.0452*** Firm operating region north=1, 0 otherwise 6.5912 4.9495 4.6917 14.6407 3.1978 13.5973 Firm production process dry=1, 0 otherwise 5.9508 3.2182 -1.1599 -9.2747 -0.5641 -13.7670 GDP growth rates -0.3537 -0.2757 -0.6825** -1.0202 -0.5706** -0.8155 Central bank base interest rate -0.9448** -0.5488*** -0.4527*** -0.9338** -0.5023*** -0.7254** Industry competition: Herfindhal index -214.6688* 75.3303 56.5720 -268.5185* 38.0642 -138.3087 Industry profitability 0.3152 0.5983*** 0.4959*** 0.7659** 0.5346*** 0.7291*** Initial condition: Log of firm assets -5 year before privatisation   0.4175 8.1670*** 6.3885*** 3.8147 7.9584*** 0.6145 Initial condition: Leverage -5 year average before privatisation   0.0011 -0.0306 0.1107** 0.1184 0.0589 0.1562* Initial condition: perform. -5 year average before  privatisation   0.2367 0.6410*** 0.6242*** 0.3101* 0.6379*** 0.2921** Constant -103.6261*** -51.5917*** -33.4591** -107.9288*** -35.9080** -40.1367 Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242 Number of firms 11 11 11 11 11 11  Empirical tests of parameters (sum of above parameters) 1-5 years after privatised (a) -2.5545 2.8973 5.5921*** 3.4656 4.4154** 5.6994* 1-10 years after privatised (a+b) -4.0345 2.2686 6.8527* 4.7784 6.0442 12.7995* 1-15 years after privatised (a+b+c) -13.1170 1.1202 7.8355 2.8911 8.0437 14.0544 1-20 years after privatised (a+b+c+d) -46.6381** -6.2354 2.6771 -31.2973 4.5261 -11.5790 
Notes: Statistical significance determined by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Capacity utilization and export revenues/total sales treated as endogenous. Dependent variables financial ratios are calculated as: return on sale (ROS) 
= net after tax income/gross sale, return on assets (ROA1) = net profit before tax/assets, return on assets (ROA2) = gross profit (loss)/assets, operating profit margin (OPM1) = (gross profit (loss)-admin & selling exp.)/net sale, 
operating profit margin (OPM2) = (gross profit (loss)-admin & selling exp.)/total assets, gross profit margin (GPM) = (gross profit (loss) + depreciation)/net sale. 
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Table 4: Long term determinants of privatized firms’ efficiency (panel data Hausman Taylor estimator estimates)  NIE SE ASPE CAPUT IM ACP        1-5 years after privatised (a) -0.0414 0.7187** 0.9221 8.0565*** 9.8907 19.8212** 6-10 years after  privatised (b) 0.2271 1.1085** 1.3682 1.1741 -12.1312 13.8606 11-15 years after privatised (c) 0.3744** 1.2502** 3.0351 7.9088** -53.1141** 35.5875** 16-20 years after privatised (d) -0.4643** 0.7994 3.7459 18.7642*** -0.5422 96.3032*** Firm sales tax  paid/total revenues -1.6709** -8.9374*** -21.8849** -2.5086 -113.5342 74.9586 Firm excise duty paid/total revenues -1.5994*** -8.1779*** -14.2383** 12.4574 -55.8022 53.2982 Firm capacity utilisation   0.1628* 1.2924*** 2.2931** 46.1743*** -16.7105 -46.5422*** Firm export revenues/sales   0.0128 0.1447*** 0.2473 -0.0925 4.8555** 1.5280 Firm size measured by production capacity 0.2385*** 2.9195*** 5.7886*** -5.0170*** -20.3543* -31.5315*** Firm assets turn over 0.1345** 0.1452 -3.4054*** 2.5220** 27.8090*** 0.2675 Firm working capital ratio 0.0024*** 0.0026* 0.0079 0.0141* 0.1603** 0.0051 Firm age (years) -0.0256 -0.2645 1.4342 -8.7108*** 11.4054 -33.3296*** Firm operating region north=1, 0 otherwise 0.1759 2.6868 4.6069 -3.9439 62.5143 -58.9943 Firm production process dry=1, 0 otherwise 0.0162 -1.9781 -1.3387 -3.0558 -15.8627 -14.0436 GDP growth rates 0.0293* -0.0958* 0.0866 -0.1796 2.3468 -0.0042 Central bank base interest rate -0.0129 -0.0118 0.0443 0.0668 -3.1214** -0.8119 Industry competition: Herfindhal index -7.8405** -8.7974 24.4089 -11.4659 -871.4803** -165.5714 Industry profitability 0.0247*** -0.0127 -0.1063 0.3062*** 0.6406 0.0745 Initial condition: firm assets -5 year before privatisation   -0.0333 0.1559 -0.8071 3.6195** 40.8961*** 7.7655 Initial condition: firm leverage -5 year average before privatisation   0.0034 0.0067 -0.0055 -0.0020 -1.5747*** 0.1146 Initial condition: firm perform. -5 year average before  privatisation   -0.0039 -0.0153 -0.0459 0.1295* 1.0129* 0.7674** Constant -1.2414* -20.5313*** -38.4512*** -90.5574*** 25.4737 487.7365*** Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242 Number of firms 11 11 11 11 11 11        Empirical tests of parameters (sum of above parameters) 1-5 years after privatised (a) -0.0414 0.7187** 0.9221 8.0565*** 9.8907 19.8212** 1-10 years after privatised (a+b) 0.1856 1.8272*** 2.2903 9.2306** -2.2405 33.6819* 1-15 years after privatised (a+b+c) 0.5600 3.0774*** 5.3254 17.1394*** -55.3546 69.2694** 1-20 years after privatised (a+b+c+d) 0.0958 3.8768** 9.0714 35.9035*** -55.8968 165.5726*** 
Notes: Statistical significance determined by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Capacity utilization and export revenues/total sales treated as endogenous. Dependent variables financial ratios are calculated as explained as follows: 
net income efficiency (NIE) = net after tax income/labour, sales efficiency   (SE) = net sale/labour, assets efficiency (ae) = assets/labour, capacity utilization (CAPUT) = actual production/production capacity, interval measure (IM) = 
(cash and bank balance + short term investment)/financial expenses, average collection period (ACP) = trade receivables/(net sale/360). 
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Table 5: Long term determinants of privatized firms’ financial strength (panel data Hausman Taylor estimator estimates) 
 LEVER CR WCR TIE NWTL       1-5 years after privatised (a) -7.8145** 4.0676 -2.5300 8.8623 2.6628 6-10 years after  privatised (b) -16.2405*** 1.3716 -54.5275** -1.8951 24.7628*** 11-15 years after privatised (c) -1.8368 -3.8311 -33.7392 -12.6350 11.5257 16-20 years after privatised (d) -1.8199 9.2968 -47.0683 29.2785 -6.0658 Firm sales tax paid/total revenues 20.5609 -86.1235** 211.3684** -252.0263*** 71.5023** Firm excise duty paid/total revenues 30.4623 10.9090 35.6218 -93.9956 14.4078 Firm capacity utilisation -5.4954* -1.1071 21.8968* -17.0042 16.0458*** Firm export revenues/sales  -0.6684 -0.5532 -0.9058 5.6373*** 1.8206*** Firm size measured by production capacity 3.4766 0.6378 -9.6200 -51.0389*** 9.1117*** Firm assets turn over -14.4678*** -10.5872*** -14.7360* 58.7667*** -12.0580*** Firm working capital ratio -0.0372** 0.8205***  0.0171 0.1050*** Firm age (years) -4.1559 13.6132 35.7770* -3.5186 -26.9962*** Firm operating region north =1, 0 otherwise -5.9748 11.8151 4.3424 30.1538 1.0388 Firm production process dry =1, 0 otherwise -14.4081** 16.1260 53.9838 -15.3729 -22.6919 GDP growth rates 0.0004 -1.0590 4.9288** 1.6029 2.0533*** Central bank base interest rate -0.0358 -1.6960*** 4.4419*** -1.9492 0.4044 Industry competition: Herfindhal index -107.3592 -85.4654 -29.7192 -143.9767 430.6402*** Industry profitability -0.2112 0.2226 0.3978 0.0289 0.4929* Initial condition: firm assets -5 year before privatisation   -8.9131*** 2.4321 -19.2441 60.5263*** 7.7841** Initial condition: firm leverage -5 year average before privatisation   0.7715*** -0.0331 -0.5700 -0.4065 0.0716 Initial condition: firm perform. -5 year average before  privatisation   0.0027 0.1938 0.1283 2.8611*** -0.0941 Constant 112.1528*** 5.2197 -89.5906 1.4277 -87.3244** Observations 242 242 242 242 242 Number of firms 11 11 11 11 11       Empirical tests of parameters (sum of above parameters) 1-5 years after privatised (a) -7.8145** 4.0676 -2.5300 8.8623 2.6628 1-10 years after privatised (a+b) -24.0550*** 5.4392 -57.0575* 6.9672 27.4256*** 1-15 years after privatised (a+b+c) -25.8918** 1.6081 -90.7968* -5.6678 38.9513*** 1-20 years after privatised (a+b+c+d) -27.7117 10.9048 -137.8651* 23.6107 32.8855 
Notes: Statistical significance determined by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Capacity utilization and export revenues/total sales treated as endogenous. Dependent variables financial ratios are calculated as explained as follows: leverage ratio 
(LEVER) = long term loans/total equity, cash ratio (CR) = (cash and bank balance + short term investment)/current liabilities, working capital ratio (WCR) = (current assets-current liabilities)/current liabilities, net worth to total liabilities (NWTL) = 
(assets-current liabilities)/total liabilities, time interest earned (TIE) = (gross profit- admin + selling exp. & depreciation)/financial expenses. 
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Table 6: Long term determinants of privatized firms’ output and investment (panel data 
Hausman Taylor estimator estimates)  RSALE CES CEA     1-5 years after privatised (a) 1.8391 -5.8205 3.7147 6-10 years after  privatised (b) -1.0777 -14.0642 -0.1521 11-15 years after privatised (c) 4.7823 -32.3398 -10.3561 16-20 years after privatised (d) 19.4596** -80.1821* -13.2366 Firm sales tax paid/total revenues -96.3256*** 183.2738 24.7543 Firm excise duty paid/total revenues -33.6381* 53.4203 7.1234 Firm capacity utilisation 26.0086*** -21.5844 6.7408* Firm export revenues/sales 0.3476 1.6696 1.0332* Firm size measured by production capacity 29.9427*** -19.8800 -2.3995 Firm assets turn over 2.0640 -52.5491*** -10.0711*** Firm working capital ratio 0.0057 0.0955 0.0186 Firm age (years) -0.2562 46.9261 13.0918** Firm operating region north =1, 0 otherwise 19.5350 12.6807 -0.5145 Firm production process dry =1, 0 otherwise -13.3108 9.6619 3.2436 GDP growth rates -1.2657** 1.0205 0.5880 Central bank base interest rate 0.3108 0.3925 -0.5821 Industry competition: Herfindhal index -39.8785 1,702.1786** 104.2079 Industry profitability -0.0100 0.1584 0.0937 Initial condition: firm assets -5 year before privatisation   -2.6632 15.3990 -0.6385 Initial condition: firm leverage -5 year average before privatisation   -0.0084 -0.5601 -0.0509 Initial condition: firm perform. -5 year average before  privatisation   -0.2110 0.0161 -0.1002 Constant -248.3336*** -115.7399 -44.3735 Observations 242 231 231 Number of firm 11 11 11     Empirical tests of parameters (sum of above parameters) 1-5 years after privatised (a) 1.8391 -5.8205 3.7147 1-10 years after privatised (a+b) 0.7614 -19.8847 3.5625 1-15 years after privatised (a+b+c) 5.5437 -52.2244 -6.7936 1-20 years after privatised (a+b+c+d) 25.0032 -132.4065 -20.0301 
Notes: Statistical significance determined by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Capacity utilization and export revenues/total sales treated as endogenous. 
Dependent variables financial ratios are calculated as real sales (RSALE) = gross sales/price index (cement), capital expenditure to sale (CES) = [fixed assets – 
fixed assetst-1 ]/ net sales, capital expenditure to assets (CEA) =  [fixed assets – fixed assetst-1 ]/ total assets. 
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Table 7 Sensitivity analysis: comparison with always privately owned firms 
 ROS SE CAPUT LEVER WCR NWTL RSALE CES 
         
1-5 years after reforms (a) -2.5304 -0.7463 2.3900 -5.4464 47.6050* 5.2920 -26.3411** -105.6212*** 
6-10 years after reforms (b) -0.6139 1.0280 0.3027 -10.2088 23.3232 13.7948 -30.6568** -77.3050* 
11-15 years after reforms (c) -4.5832 1.3448 5.3089 -11.7899 21.7950 19.6739 -18.4188 -72.3993 
16-20 years after reforms (d) -4.2306 0.5291 13.4842** -12.3729 5.4829 12.5569 -26.2835 -37.9585 
Firm sales tax paid/total revenues 2.4509 1.1496 -2.8716 -13.0722 28.6330 17.5081 -50.0807* 202.2461** 
Firm excise duty paid/total revenues 7.1438 0.8209 -4.6741 -32.2760*** -21.0301 1.8123 -14.2948 -9.9366 Firm capacity utilisation 14.8725*** 1.7484*** 66.6543*** 2.7797 2.4479 1.6268 39.4632*** -29.8554* Firm export revenues/sales -0.7940 -0.0065 -0.4335 0.8699 6.3008 0.3945 -3.2161* -4.9883 Firm size measured by production capacity 0.3297 2.0506*** -3.0429** -1.0435 -18.9088* -3.8067 45.8051*** -41.5090*** Firm age (years) 9.1253 0.5611 -6.5161** -3.3345 22.1850 -8.9152 25.7596** 105.4321** Firm assets turn over -1.2539 -0.5663*** -2.8465*** -5.8684** 28.1191*** -17.0822*** -0.4777 -41.5897*** Firm working capital ratio 0.0415** -0.0035 0.0079 -0.0343  0.1171*** -0.0141 -0.1468 Firm operating region north =1, 0 otherwise 4.2942 -0.1703 -3.0770 0.0154 9.6630 -2.7804 3.0755 41.3688 Industry competition: Herfindhal index 143.7047 41.8485** -116.2144 -93.6412 -617.7114 179.9805 229.8354 -650.5298 Industry profitability 0.8594*** 0.1223*** 0.3733** -0.5587 -1.7378 0.0172 0.5432 2.5267 GDP growth rates 0.4889 -0.0900 -0.4773* -0.1902 2.3754 -0.2635 -1.0556 2.7325 Central bank base interest rate -0.2455 0.1095* 0.7228** -0.8861 -1.7247 -0.1065 1.8698* 6.3177** 
Constant -99.4204*** -24.1545*** -164.2859*** 70.3910* 34.5193 103.0568** -507.1691*** 186.4745 
         
Observations 165 165 165 164 165 165 165 155 
Number of firms 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 Empirical tests of parameters (sum of above parameters) 
1-5 years after reforms (a) -2.5304 -0.7463 2.3900 -5.4464 47.6050* 5.2920 -26.3411** -105.6212*** 
1-10 years after reforms (a+b) -3.1442 0.2817 2.6927 -15.6552 70.9282 19.0868 -56.9978*** -182.9263** 
1-15 years after reforms (a+b+c) -7.7274 1.6265 8.0016 -27.4451 92.7232 38.7608* -75.4167** -255.3255** 
1-20 years after reforms (a+b+c+d) -11.9580 2.1556 21.4857 -39.8180 98.2061 51.3177 -101.7002** -293.2841* 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Contribution of macroeconomic environment 
 
Unemp. 
rate 
Interest 
rate 
Earning 
yields 
Pubic 
invest 
growth 
rate 
Develop. 
exp. 
Growth 
rate 
Foreign 
investment 
growth 
rate 
Const. 
growth 
rate 
GDP 
growth 
rate 
Sales tax 
as a % of 
gross 
sale 
1986-92 4.03 10.00 11.69 14.59 16.00 30.39 5.88 5.90 3.00 
1993-2011 6.32 12.47 10.96 10.89 11.00 22.11 2.91 4.27 8.00 
Notes: figures in %. 
 
Table 9: Long run dynamic impact of broader economy-wide reforms on input prices 
 Cement output 
price growth 
rate 
Furnace oil price 
growth rate 
Coal price 
growth 
rate 
Fuel price 
growth 
rate 
Raw material 
prices growth 
rate 
1986-92 8.48 6.45 4.68 7.93 10.56 
1993-2011 7.70 18.90 8.59 13.20 12.93 
Notes: figures in %. 
 
 
 
 
  
